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Abstract
In forensic applications of speaker recognition it is nec­
essary to  be able to  specify a confidence level for a de­
cision th a t two sets of recordings have been produced 
by the same speaker (or by different speakers). Foren­
sic phoneticians are sometimes incriminated because 
they find it impossible to  provide ’hard’ estimates of 
the confidence level of an expert opinion. In this pa­
per it is investigated to  what extent the problem can 
be solved by deploying autom atic speaker verification 
algorithms, to  work alone or to  support the work of 
forensic phoneticians. It is shown th a t for several rea­
sons hard estimates of the confidence of an opinion in a 
specific case cannot be provided by autom atic speaker 
verification either.
1. In trod u ction
Automatic Speaker Verification (SV) and Forensic 
Casework have long been considered as essentially un­
related disciplines, because the former was seen as a 
one alternative forced choice problem, whereas the lat­
ter used to be presented as a an open set identifica­
tion problem. However, [1] has pointed out th a t many 
forensic cases boil down to the question whether a set 
of recordings, some of which are definitely from the 
perpetrator and others from a single suspect, do or do 
not originate from the same speaker. In other words: 
many forensic cases can be formulated as a one alter­
native forced choice problem.
One broad class of cases where autom atic SV tech­
niques might prove to  be useful in forensic work is in 
the processing of telephone taps th a t are made in the 
investigation of drug trafficking cases. Very often, the 
perpetrators are foreigners, who speak a language un­
known to the police officers but also to  the forensic 
phoneticians. In many cases the police is interested 
in knowing how many different speakers are involved 
in a given set of telephone taps. Leaving the speaker 
recognition task to  interpreters has been shown to be
unreliable, if only because of possible links between 
the interpreters and the criminals. Such links are to 
be expected if the case is investigated in a small lan­
guage community, where the number of persons who 
speak the language is small. In these cases a tex t­
independent SV system might be of great help.
In all stages of forensic applications of speaker recog­
nition it is im portant th a t one is able to  state a con­
fidence interval for conclusions regarding the identity 
of the voices of a known suspect and an unknown per­
petrator. If the statem ent must be used in a court, 
a specification of the confidence level is necessary to 
allow the judge to  weigh this piece of evidence. If 
it is to  be used during the police investigation, con­
fidence levels will be used to  weigh the evidence in 
setting priorities for investigating specific suspects. In 
the harassment case described in this paper, the confi­
dence statem ent was used to  decide on how to proceed 
with the investigation.
It is well known th a t forensic phoneticians often have 
difficulty in making estimates of the confidence level 
with which they can identify a person by her/his voice. 
Thus, forensic case workers are interested to  know to 
what extent the use of autom atic SV systems could be 
used to  obtain an ’objective’ confidence estimate.
In this paper we investigate the implications of using 
an SV system to estimate the confidence level for an 
identity statem ent on the basis of a specific case tha t 
was brought to  our attention by a Dutch private inves­
tigations bureau. A male person left obscene messages 
in the voice mail boxes of female employees of a large 
IT company. The calls could be traced to  handsets in 
in-house classrooms. Three victims identify the same 
colleague as the likely perpetrator, but the accused 
person denied all charges, and agreed to  collaborate 
in a test in which he read transcripts of the messages. 
The speech was recorded in one of the classrooms, us­
ing the same handset type and the same voice mail 
system as during the harassing calls. However, while
the harassment calls were whispered, probably with 
the intent to sound ’sexy’, the test calls were read 
with normal voice. Approximately one month after 
the test recordings the harassing calls started again, 
in a whispery voice and from the same classrooms. 
Now. the obvious question is whether the two sets of 
harassing calls have been made by the same speaker, 
and whether this speaker is the same person as the 
one who read the transcripts. Obviously, this prob­
lem can be cast in the form of a one alternative forced 
choice problem: we can take the test calls for build­
ing a voice pattern of a known speaker, and try to 
answer the question whether all harassing calls have 
been made by the same person.
In this paper we take this case as the starting point 
to investigate to the contingencies of applying the 
procedures and technology developed for Automatic 
Speaker Verification to forensic cases that can be for­
mulated as speaker verification problems.
2. Evaluation M easures
In principle, one might think that stating confi­
dence levels and intervals for the decision of an au­
tomatic SV system should be trivial. For all serious 
SV products performance figures are available, that 
specify the proportion of false accepts and false re­
jects. Equal Error Rates, or ROC or DET curves [2]. 
Thus, one might expect that a properly built SV sys­
tem should be able to produce an objective confidence 
measure on an absolute scale. This would allow the 
system to be used by virtually every police officer. Un­
fortunately. the conventional performance measures 
cannot be used to derive a confidence measure that 
is appropriate for individual cases. This is because 
all the measures mentioned above are only valid as 
averages over large numbers of genuine and impos­
tor attem pts. In fact, these measures characterise the 
overall behaviour of the system; unfortunately, they 
do not allow to make inferences about specific individ­
ual cases treated by a system. Of course, in forensic 
work it is only individual cases that m atter. A sim­
ple way to illustrate why some average measure of the 
performance of an SV system is not adequate in foren­
sic work is to look at an example. Fig. 1 shows the 
proportions of false accepts (left hand curve) and false 
rejects (right hand curve) of our text-independent SV 
system as a function of thresholds set in terms of the 
log-likelihood ratio (LLR) score of test samples. In 
addition, two individual cases are depicted. Both are 
in the range of LLR values where the case would prob­
ably be accepted as the true speaker (since both are 
beyond the LLR value that corresponds to equal prob­
abilities of false reject and false accept). However, it is
False Accept and False Reject Rate
Figure 1: False Reject and False accept rates as a func­
tion of the LLR threshold value. The dashed vertical 
lines represent two individual cases with LLR values 
greater than the LLR for Equal Error Rate.
obvious that the cases are very different. Even if case 
# 1  has a ’positive’ LLR score, it is only marginally so. 
whereas the LLR score for case # 2  makes a false ac­
cept very unlikely (but not impossible). Therefore, the 
confidence that one should attach to an accept/reject 
decision of this system is certainly different from its 
EER (or whatever conventional average performance 
measure provided by the system manufacturer).
The example in Fig. 1 might suggest that it should 
be possible to base confidence measures in individ­
ual cases on the LLR value proper. This is the more 
so because the likelihood ratio is introduced to nor­
malise the otherwise unsealed raw likelihood values
[3]. One might be tem pted to assume that likelihood 
ratio scores are measures on a ratio scale; unfortu­
nately. in actual practice. LLR’s are measures on an 
ordinal scale [4].
There are two reasons why the LLR produced by 
a speaker verification system must be interpreted as 
measurements on an ordinal scale:
• The LLR values output by an SV system do not 
only depend on the characteristics of the test 
sample(s). but also on the reference models used 
to normalise the scores. The choice of reference 
models depends on a large number of design de­
cisions. Some systems use customer dependent 
cohort models, while other use customer indepen­
dent world models. In the latter case, a system 
may choose gender dependent or gender indepen­
dent world models. All these decisions will af­
fect the LLR score assigned to a test sample. For 
SV systems that come with built-in world mod­
els. it may not always bo known in detail what the 
reference models are. For systems that build co­
hort models, the client models (and therefore also 
the LLR scores) will always depend on the cohort 
database available at the time of enrolment.
• Even if it is known with what kind of speech the 
reference models have been trained, their actual 
impact on the LLR score depends on many im­
plementation details, that are often considered as 
information proprietary to the system manufac­
turer.
Of course, a laboratory involved in forensic casework 
could build a custom SV system, so that both the ref­
erence models and all relevant implementation details 
are known. Still, this does not promote the LLR val­
ues to the status of scores on a true ratio scale. There 
remains a long list of factors that do have an impact on 
the LLR scores. The confidence interval of an identity 
statem ent can only be estimated reliably if the impact 
of all factors that are relevant in a specific case can be 
quantified.
In general terms, the LLR scores depend on the degree 
of mismatch between the training and testing condi­
tions. For the training not only the speech recordings 
of the known subject (the suspect, in forensic case­
work). but also the speech used to create the refer­
ence models counts. Ideally, the speech used to train 
the suspect’s model and the speech used to train  the 
reference models should be recorded under the exact 
same conditions; these conditions should be equal to 
those prevailing during the recording of the perpetra­
to r’s speech. In many real life cases the conditions un­
der which the perpetrator’s speech has been recorded 
may not be known exactly; if more than one recording 
is available, they may come from different environ­
ments. using different microphones and transmission 
channels.
3. The Speaker R ecognition system
In order to be able to build the ’ideal’ SV system, 
in which the influence of the complete set of factors 
that determine the exact LLR value are explicitly ac­
counted for. one would need to carry out a large num­
ber of controlled experiments. Since it is not our in­
tention to even approximate such a system, we will 
rather demonstrate the impact of a couple of factors 
on the LLR scores, and therewith on the False Accept 
and False Reject Rates. The experiments are based on 
the text-independent speaker verification task in the 
1998 NIST Speaker Recognition Evaluation [2]. The 
speech used in the experiments was taken from the 
SwitchBoard-2 Phase 1 corpus. Thus, all recordings
Gender
Figure 2: False Reject and False accept rates as a 
function of the LLR threshold value for female and 
male subjects.
were made over the US switched public telephone net­
work. the language used by the speakers was Ameri­
can English, and the speech was conversational (some 
test samples mainly consist of back channel utterances 
like yea, ehm, huhhuh, etc.). The figures shown in this 
paper were obtained with the A 2R T  system, that ap­
peared to perform reasonably well in the 1998 test 
campaign.
The speaker recognition system used to generate the 
FRR and FAR curves is a text-independent SV sys­
tem. Since the system is intended for use with tele­
phone speech, the signals are sampled with a frequency 
of 8 kHz. Samples can be either in 8-bit A-law or //-law 
format, or in 16 bit linear format. Paramotorisation is 
based on 25.6 ms frames, with a 10 ms frame shift. For 
each frame 12 LPC copstra and log-onorgy are com­
puted; the total feature vector is formed by append­
ing the delta’s and dolta-dolta’s of the 13 coefficients, 
making for a total of 39 features. For each ’client’ 
a single model has been trained, using 2 minutes of 
speech, recorded in a single session. Ergodic four state 
HMM models have been trained, with 32 Gaussian 
mixture densities per state. Reference models with 
the same topology have been trained using recordings 
of a large number of speakers, none of whom is among 
the ’clients’. Separate reference models for male and 
female speakers were built.
For testing we have used speech samples with a dura­
tion of 30 seconds.
3.1. Gender
Gender is among the most obvious factors that one 
would want to control. From Fig. 2 it is clear that the
Handset type of test segment
Figure 3: False Reject and False accept rates as a 
function of the LLR threshold value for carbon button 
and oloctrot microphone handsets.
FRR and FAR curves for the two sexes are virtually 
identical. This means that in our SV system the LLR 
scores are virtually independent of the gender of the 
’client’. It should, however, be emphasised that this 
result cannot be generalised to other SV systems. 
3.2. Handset
All experiments with the SwitchBoard data have 
shown that the type of handset microphone has an 
enormous impact on the error rates. Fig. 3 shows the 
FAR and FRR curves for oloctrot and carbon button 
microphones. From the figure it can be soon that the 
FAR rates for the two handset types are very close to 
each other. For the FRR rates, on the other hand, 
the curves are far apart: for speech samples recorded 
with a carbon button microphone the FRR is much 
higher tha t for samples recorded with an oloctrot mi­
crophone. Although the exact EER points will differ 
between SV systems, it must be expected that the re­
sults will generalise to every system. This is due to 
the significantly larger degree of variability exhibited 
by carbon button microphones.
4. Bayesian D ecision Theory
One (but certainly not the only one) way to esti­
mate the confidence to be attached to an accept/reject 
decision in speaker verification is to compute poste­
rior probabilities in the Bayesian sense. In making 
accept/reject decisions three important pieces of infor­
mation must be distinguished and taken into account:
P  is the prior probability that the suspect is the 
searched criminal, without taking the speech evi­
dence into account, but only based on indepen­
dent evidence or counter-evidence. In forensic
cases this kind of information usually conies from 
the investigating officer. In civil applications of 
autom atic SV information on the prior proba­
bility that an identity claim is true can come 
from the match between previous behaviour of the 
client and a new transaction that is attem pted [5].
LLR value of the speech evidence. This is the out­
put of the verification module of the ASV system 
while checking the hypothesis that the suspect is 
the same person as the searched criminal (or the 
genuine customer in civil applications).
FA R  and F R R  are the false accept rate and the 
false reject rate of the ASV system under oper­
ating conditions similar to those applying in the 
case at hand.
When all three inputs are available, we can compute 
the a posteriori error probabilities. Given that we ac­
cept the hypothesis that the suspect is the same as 
the criminal, the error probability is equal to (with P. 
LLR. FAR. and FRR as defined above)
r i - P l  FAR(LLR)
=  [1-P]FAR(LLR) +  P[1-FRR(LLR)]
And given that we reject this hypothesis, the error 
probability is equal to
P FRR (LLR)
=  [1-P] [l-FAR(LLR)] +  P FRR(LLR)
The posterior error probabilities for the two cases in 
Fig. 1 are plotted in Fig. 4. In this example the 
prior probability P  is (arbitrarily) set equal to 0.75. 
It is clear that if we accept case # 2 . the posterior 
error probability is almost zero. Thus, accepting case 
# 2  only leaves a very minor risk of making the wrong 
decision. However, if we accept case # 1 . the risk of 
making the wrong decision is still approximately 5%.
The Bayesian approach to combining prior proba­
bilities and actual scores derived from pieces of evi­
dence (speech samples) requires that P  and LLR are 
independent. Thus, eventually P  must be estimated 
by the judge in a forensic case, not by the forensic 
phonetician. If the latter would bring P  to bear, the 
equivalent of the LLR score assigned to a set of speech 
samples on the basis of the speech only could no longer 
bo considered as unbiased.
Interestingly, in the T-Netix commercial SV system 
the equivalent of the prior probability P  is one of 
the inputs to the function that computes the verifica­
tion score (in addition to the speech sample under test 
and -indirectly- a database of anti-speakers that was
Figuro 4: Posterior error probabilities
used during the discriminative training of the model 
of the claimed speaker) [6]. This should result in a bi­
ased score. In the A 2R T  SV system the LLR score is 
not biased by prior probabilities; the application must 
make an explicit decision as how to combine this LLR 
score with whatever independent evidence that might 
be available.
5. The harassment case
We can now revisit the harassment case, introduced 
above. In some sense it seems to be relatively easy: 
the recordings of all three sets of harassment calls can 
be traced to the exact same recording environment. 
In addition, in both sets of criminal recordings the 
speaker used a whispery voice. Thus, one would ex­
pect that the confidence level for the decision whether 
or not these sets of calls come from the same speaker 
should be high. Of course, this intuitive reasoning as­
sumes that the relevant within-speaker variability is 
not increased significantly because of the non-normal 
way of speaking. Since the texts spoken in the two 
sets of recordings differ, we are obliged to use text­
independent SV methods, which are known to be less 
powerful than text-dependent methods.
We had three recordings available to base a judge­
ment on. The speech recordings came on CD-ROMS 
in MS-WAVE format (stereo. 44.1 kHz sampling rate 
and 16 bit per sample). The detailed specifications 
of the company voice mail system used to record the 
three sets of calls were not available to us. Thus, we 
do not know whether the signals have boon treated by 
some kind of coding mechanism to reduce the number 
of bytes needed to store messages in the voice mail 
boxes. This creates one possible mismatch between 
the data from this case and all other speech data that 
we had available to build world models. Anyway, since
we were not in the position to record large numbers 
of (male) speakers under the same conditions that ap­
plied in the case, we decided to use recordings from 
the Dutch Polyphone corpus [7] and the Dutch SESP 
corpus [8] to build the world model; both corpora are 
recorded over the public switched telephone network. 
Polyphone comprises only domestic calls, while the 
bettor part of SESP consists of international calls. The 
combination of the two corpora represents a very large 
range of recording conditions and handsets. This se­
lection is an attem pt not to bias the world models to 
any conceivable specific condition different from the 
condition prevailing during the recordings in the case. 
Rather, we try to cover the most general condition 
possible. From Polyphone we took 439 phonetically 
rich sentences read by 72 male speakers; from SESP 
we took 384 spontaneous utterances (answers to ques­
tions like Describe the environment you are calling 
from) from 68 male speakers. The recordings from 
the case were downsampled to 8 kHz to make them 
compatible with the sampling rate in the speech for 
the world model.
The total duration of the first harassment calls was 
74.4 seconds; the second set of harassment calls had 
a total duration of 91.5 s. The total duration of the 
read speech recorded from the suspect was 52.8 s. If 
we take all speech from each of the three conditions 
for enrolment, we still have substantially less m ater­
ial than the two minutes used in the NIST evaluation 
experiments. We decided to use all material to enrol 
three client models, that will be referred to as GDI 
(for the first set of harassment calls). CD2 (for the 
read material), and CD3 (for the second set of harass­
ment calls). Speaker models and the world model were 
based on acoustic features consisting of 12 LPC cep- 
stra plus log-energy. and their deltas and delta-deltas. 
making for feature vectors with 39 components. LPC 
analysis was performed with 25.6 ms Hamming win­
dows. with 100 frames/second. The models were er- 
godic HMMs. with 4 states and 4 Gaussian densities 
per state. The world model was trained first, starting 
from scratch. The client models were then adapted 
from the world model.
Impostor distributions were trained for the three client 
models by matching a large number of Polyphone and 
SESP recordings, not used to build the world model 
against each of the models and retaining the result­
ing LLR score. Subsequently, we obtained LLRs for 
the speech used to train GDI matched against CD2 
and CD3. for the speech used to build CD2 matched 
against GDI and CD3. and for the speech underlying 
CD3 matched against GDI and CD2.
Not surprisingly, the match between CD1 and CD3 
was very close. Also the matches of CD2 with CD1 
and CD3 were very close, especially compared to  the 
LLR values found for the impostor trials. Yet, we still 
cannot be sure th a t the extremely unlikely LLR val­
ues obtained for the matches between CD1, CD2 and 
CD3 (unlikely against the impostor distributions tha t 
were previously obtained) really imply th a t the speak­
ers in the two sets of harassment calls must be one and 
the same person, nor th a t this person is the suspect 
who recorded the speech for CD2. It is possible tha t 
the large difference between LLR values for our im­
postor speech and the test speech is due to  unknown, 
but systematic effects in the recordings of the perpe­
tra to r and the suspect. Even if th a t may be difficult 
to  imagine, based on the limited knowledge th a t was 
available to  us we cannot completely rule out this pos­
sibility. Recall th a t we were not given any information 
on the waveform coding employed by the voice mail 
system used to  record all test utterances. Also, all 
test calls were recorded under the same acoustic con­
ditions, with the same type of handset; both the room 
acoustics and the handset in the test speech may have 
been idiosyncratic, thereby adding to  the difference 
between the LLRs computed for (non-matching) im­
postor trials and the (matching) test trials. Of course, 
had the case been im portant enough to  warrant the 
costs, we could have recorded a sufficiently large and 
varied set of anti-speakers to  train  the world model 
and of additional speakers to  train  the LLR distribu­
tions of genuine and impostor trials in a matching con­
dition. However, such cases are the exception, rather 
than the rule.
In the case under analysis we had no information to es­
tim ate an independent prior probability of the speak­
ers in the three sets of recordings being the same per­
son. Careful and detailed phonetic analysis yielded a 
long list of speech features in the three sets of record­
ings th a t were very similar, yet sufficiently exceptional 
to  consider them as idiosyncratic. However, even if 
such phonetic information cannot be brought to  bear 
on the speaker models of our SV system in any direct 
and explicit way, it still is very dangerous to  consider 
it as independent evidence.
5.1. The outcom e
The eventual decision in a forensic case has very- 
little to  say about the confidence and tru th  of the 
forensic phonetician’s opinion about the identity of 
the speakers who produced two sets of speech sam­
ples. This is so because the final decision may have 
been based almost completely on other evidence (or 
in the case of a dismissal on technical mistakes in the
way the case was brought before the judge). Yet, it 
is always interesting to  know the final verdict. In the 
case at hand there never was one. The suspect main­
tained his denial, and the harassment calls stopped 
after the second set used in this study. Therefore, the 
company dropped the case.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the factors th a t have 
an impact on the LLR scores produced by automatic 
speaker recognition systems. It was explained why 
these scores are measurements on an ordinal scale. 
Therefore, the absolute values of the scores cannot be 
used as the sole data  to  attribute a formal confidence 
value to  the decision to  accept or reject the test sample 
as coming from the claimed speaker. Automatic SV 
systems can only be used in forensic field work to  sub­
stitute the ’subjective’ confidence score attributed to 
an opinion by a forensic phonetician if sufficient data 
can be provided (to train  world models and estimate 
impostor distributions) th a t match the case.
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